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BERNARD WILLIAMS, REPUBLICANISM, AND THE LIBERALISM OF FEAR: 
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 
Thom Brooks 
 
Introduction 
Bernard Williams speaks approvingly of “the liberalism of fear” (2005). The liberalism of 
fear is an idea first found in the writings of Judith Shklar (1989). This chapter offers a brief 
presentation of what is the liberalism of fear and focusses on why Williams finds this idea 
attractive.  My argument will be that the liberalism of fear has a close affinity with the theory 
of republicanism, challenging the distinctiveness of the liberalism of fear. Furthermore, I will 
argue that republicanism represents a more compelling political philosophy more generally. 
 
The Liberalism of Fear 
Fear has a special place in liberalism and the history of political thought. Thomas Hobbes’ 
Leviathan addresses the need to avoid a world dominated by fear and much worse. We agree 
a social contract forming bonds of political obligation between us to avoid reverting back to a 
state of nature, a form of life characterized as a war of one person against all, where “notions 
of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place,” and where our lives are 
“solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes 1996: 89-91). For Hobbes, it is only our 
“Feare of Death” that sufficiently motivates us towards peace (Hobbes 1996: 90). Note that 
our fear plays a positive role in directing individuals to avoid conflict in favour of peaceful 
security. Indeed, such motivation is a Law of Nature, for Hobbes, consistent with our natural 
reason (Hobbes 1996: 91). So liberalism is no stranger to fear and they may be brought 
together for beneficial ends. 
The so-called “liberalism of fear” addresses a related and important human need: our 
freedom from fear. Williams says: 
 
We say ‘never again’, but somewhere someone is being tortured right now, and acute 
fear has again become a common form of social control . . . The liberalism of fear is a 
response to these undeniable actualities and therefore concentrates on damage control 
(2005: 55). 
 
Our fear, the fear of our domination by the state, plays a crucial and constructive role in our 
lives. For example, the liberalism of fear helps us focus on our attention upon our 
vulnerabilities and for good reason. Fear does not paralyze us, but it instead seeks to motivate 
us to action. Individual rights are here understood as a “necessary protection against threat of 
power” where such state power may exploit our vulnerabilities (Williams 2005: 56). Our 
concern for our protection of rights is not merely reactive and post facto, but an ever present 
feature of our political lives. Thus, fear plays an important and constructive role in alerting us 
to our vulnerabilities which, in turn, help illuminate the protective necessity of rights. 
The liberalism of fear is modelled upon an antagonistic model of the self and the state. 
The state is conceived as some entity beyond the individual where the interests of the state 
may encroach upon the interests of the individual. The state is a potential “enemy” from 
which the individual must keep in control (Williams 2005: 56). Such an understanding about 
liberalism then serves a constructive role in focusing our attention on individual protections, 
such as the negative rights of the individual. Fear and liberalism work together for the benefit 
of individuals, or so their relation has been interpreted. 
This view of liberalism is neither negative nor positive, but perhaps a combination of 
both. For example, Williams says: “Note how this conception coincides neither with 
‘negative’ nor with ‘positive’ freedom” (2005: 61). The basic idea behind the liberalism of 
fear is that our lacking freedom may be caused by the power of another over us. We may lack 
freedom by another restraining us or by our inability to do or achieve some desired goal. The 
perspectives of negative and positive freedom are then not wholly opposed concepts, but they 
share a common core: “The basic sense of being unfree is being in someone else’s power” 
(Williams 2005: 61). Negative freedom proponents may argue that freedom may consist in 
lacking interference by other persons (see Berlin 1969: 122). An individual is free when 
unrestrained by other persons, but only directly. For example, it is possible to be forbidden 
equality of opportunities that prevent me from desired goals without being restrained by 
another. This power others have over my pursuit of goals and interests is not captured by the 
idea of negative freedom. Positive freedom proponents might also claim that freedom is being 
under one’s own power (see Green 1991: 22). But this idea might also fail to capture the 
sense of our being under the power of others. Both negative and positive freedom proponents 
can accept that the condition of being not free is understood as our being in the power (or 
dominion) of someone else. We lack control.  
Finally, the liberalism of fear helps serve as a constant and useful reminder. We are 
motivated to act by reminding ourselves of the precious freedoms and rights we possess and 
how fragile they are (see Williams 2005: 60). Martha Nussbaum has written about “the 
fragility of goodness” which is relevant here. Thus, perhaps we might speak in this case of 
the fragility of freedom and rights as well (see Nussbaum 1986). In other words, our fragility 
is not merely related to our moral goodness, but also our freedoms and rights. John Stuart 
Mill speaks to this concern where he argues for the need of every society to constantly 
challenge and re-examine its ideas about itself in a thorough-going manner (1989). Our 
freedoms are fragile and require constant and careful attention. It is important to continually 
renew our self-understanding of how we conceive of our freedoms and how they might be 
best protected. It is also important that we never lose sight of our vulnerability, lest we allow 
our precious freedoms to slip away. 
Bernard Williams is attracted to the liberalism of fear for many persuasive reasons. 
This political idea is suitably sensitive to our human vulnerabilities and the fragility of 
goodness as well as much else. It rests on neither a mere positive nor negative view of 
freedom, but bridges across them both and it understands that the condition of unfreedom is 
at root being in the power of another. Finally, the liberalism of fear conceives the individual 
in critical engagement with the state. The state is not necessarily a source of evil, but it is 
seen as a potential adversary from which the individual demands protections, such as 
entrenched rights. 
These ideas fit together well, and the picture has persuasive power with much to 
recommend it. Nevertheless, I do not believe that the liberalism of fear is an especially novel 
understanding of political freedom because it shares too much with republicanism. Moreover, 
I will argue that there is more to recommend about republicanism than the liberalism of fear. 
If we are attracted by a liberalism of fear, then we should endorse republicanism instead. I 
shall turn to this discussion now.  
 
Republicanism and the liberalism of fear 
I would like to contrast the liberalism of fear with its close philosophical cousin, 
republicanism. The tradition of republicanism has deep and ancient roots that extend to 
Cicero and Seneca and the tradition continues today, inspired by the work of Philip Pettit 
(1997) and Quentin Skinner (1997) amongst others. Indeed, republicanism arguably predates 
liberalism of all varieties.
i
 
The republican tradition as defended by Pettit, for example has much in common with 
the liberalism of fear. Both are alive to our human vulnerabilities and the need for the 
protection of our fragile liberties. Likewise, both the liberalism of fear and republicanism 
share the appeal of limited government. This is because republicans understand freedom as 
non-domination and discursive control. Discursive control involves the ability to reason and 
interact with others (Pettit 2001: 67). All discursive parties have equal standing: if they did 
not have some level of equality, then the discourses of some might run roughshod over others 
(see Pettit 2001: 72, 75). Discursive freedom becomes possible only where non-domination 
obtains.  
Non-domination exists where another cannot arbitrarily interfere in my affairs (Pettit 
1997: 23). Crucially, it is unimportant whether anyone does interfere: the possibility that 
another may arbitrarily interfere is sufficient for domination. The republican is always on 
guard against arbitrary interference and control, not unlike defenders of the liberalism of fear 
view. The undue power of others over ourselves is an evil to be prevented. 
Moreover, republicanism bridges negative and positive freedom also. Non-domination 
is the core of the republican idea of freedom. This is very similar to the idea that the 
condition of unfreedom, for a liberalism of fear, is being in the power of another. However, 
republicans do not oppose being in the power of another as such because they do not deny the 
possibilities of justified interference. Republicans oppose unjustified interference only. For 
example, republicans are not against criminal punishment even if they might endorse some 
models of sentencing over others. This is because imprisonment for a crime, such as murder, 
is not necessarily an arbitrary interference. A well ordered society broadly conceived does not 
arbitrarily interfere in the activities and relations of its citizens, but justifiably and 
intentionally punishes in relation to a criminal’s desert (see Brooks 2012). Some forms of 
interference can be justified, but there is a high threshold, and this is the need to guard against 
arbitrary interference understood as domination. The republican has a close eye on the power 
of the state and its potential threat to individual freedom not unlike the liberalism of fear. 
The liberalism of fear speaks to several different elements. It focuses our attention to 
the problem of domination and the need for constant reappraisal of our distinct vulnerabilities. 
Furthermore, the liberalism of fear also helps to bridge negative and positive freedom. These 
elements are not unique to the liberalism of fear, but also clearly present in republican 
theories of freedom. I have argued above that Pettit’s republican theory of freedom 
incorporates these same distinctive features as well. 
 
Living beyond fear 
So one question we might ask is whether the liberalism of fear is simply republicanism by 
another name? Republicanism has been claimed to be the elder of the two traditions, but on 
this I am no authority. However, I do not think the issue is which came first, but which is the 
most compelling. Whether or not republicanism preceded liberalism (of any variety) is much 
less important than the issue of which view is preferable. 
There is a clear difference between these competing visions. While Williams claims 
that (“in good times”) the liberalism of fear can exist as a “politics of hope,” it is difficult to 
see optimism emerging from this view (2005: 61). A liberalism of fear is a standpoint of 
anxiety, of always looking over one’s shoulder. I do not believe this vision best exemplifies 
our lived condition. The liberalism of fear would have it that our lives have not changed all 
that much since a state of nature where life is nasty, short, and even brutish. For Hobbes, 
individuals obey laws for fear of the punishment that might befall them if they act 
contrariwise. Our lives and society are maintained by the constant presence of fear: the fear 
of punishment, the fear of societal breakdown, the fear of others, etc. The liberalism of fear 
may reject Hobbes’s authoritarian state, but it accepts the central role of fear in helping us 
forge conceptions of the individual and our relation to the state. 
This Hobbesian sense of constant fear strikes me as implausible and unrealistic. The 
individual may require protection from some forms of state interference, but only those that 
are arbitrary. We do not and should not view the state as some useful beast to be safely 
encaged, but rather as a partner. While the state may arbitrarily infringe individual freedom, 
the state is not wholly other to the individual. This interrelation between the self and the state 
is unclear, if not lost, in the liberalism of fear yet it is captured by republicanism. 
Finally, our freedoms and rights command constant protection and constructive 
engagement. However, it should arise primarily in response to our discursive activities with 
one another in positive communication rather than for fear we live on a knife’s edge. This is 
again captured well by the republican tradition and its focus on discursive control and non-
domination rather than the liberalism of fear. 
 
Conclusion 
This brief chapter has outlined Williams’s positive remarks in favour of the liberalism of fear. 
I have argued that republicanism shares much with what constitutes the liberalism of fear. 
However, I have also argued that it is not merely a case of the same position parading under 
different titles. There is a clear difference between the liberalism of fear and republicanism. 
This difference can be found in their competing ideas about how we relate to ourselves and 
each other. The liberalism of fear is a view of perpetual anxiety and antagonism; 
republicanism is a more positive view of constructive engagement with others and discursive 
control. It is a truism noted as early as Thomas Hill Green’s claim that will, not force, is the 
basis of the state (1986: 89-106). The idea is that the reason the great majority of us obey 
laws is not because we fear punishment, but because we accept the laws we uphold. There is 
a tension in both views between the self and the state, but the two need not always be 
adversarial. Republicanism offers a more positive position that seems to accord best with this 
picture. Williams may be correct that a liberalism of fear may give rise to a new politics of 
hope, but I would argue that the politics of hope is best addressed by republicanism. Those 
who have been attracted to a liberalism of fear should choose republicanism instead.
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 My discussion will focus more closely on Philip Pettit’s contributions to a republican theory of freedom which 
relate more directly with the contemporary literature on freedom. 
